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Abstract 
 
Fraud is a multi-billion dollar industry that continues to grow annually. Many organisations are 
poorly prepared to prevent and detect fraud. Fraud detection strategies are intended to quickly and 
efficiently identify fraudulent activities that have circumvented preventative measures so that an 
organisation can take appropriate corrective action. This paper investigates the use of enterprise 
system audit trails to support fraud detection. A framework for analysing these audit trails for 
potential fraud is developed. Key components of the framework include; defining the data 
requirements for fraud detection; and creating a catalogue of fraud symptoms. SAP, a market leading 
enterprise system is examined. We propose a MCL-based approach for proactive fraud detection that 
entails periodic extraction and analysis of SAP accounting audit trails for potential fraud. The paper 
emphasises the importance of visual presentation of information as it is this characteristic that 
enables an auditor to effectively and efficiently find trends, correlations, and identify patterns of 
activity that may lead to important conclusions regarding potentially fraudulent activities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Fraud is inherent in all organisations. Edwin H. Sutherland, a criminologist at Indiana University, 
coined the phrase "white-collar crime" in 1939 (Wells, 2008). Donald R. Cressy, a student of 
Sutherland, was especially interested in embezzlers, whom he referred to as "trust violators". He was 
intrigued by what led these people to be overcome by temptation. Upon completion of his work, he 
developed the classic model for the occupational offender. This model or hypothesis, namely the 
"fraud triangle", underpins the theoretical foundation for this study. 
 
Fraud within organisations is a multi-billion dollar industry. Consequently, it is of major concern to 
industry and government (Best, 2005; Coenen, 2008). Fraud costs the Australian economy 
approximately $3 billion annually, and its frequency and financial impact continues to grow (KPMG, 
2008; Standards Australia, 2008). Many organisations are poorly prepared to prevent and detect fraud 
(KPMG, 2004, 2007, 2008, 2009). Fraud prevention is not infallible, therefore fraud detection is 
crucial. Fraud detection strategies are intended to quickly and efficiently identify those frauds that 
have circumvented preventative measures so that an organisation can take appropriate corrective 
action (Standards Australia, 2008).  
 
A review of various fraud surveys revealed that fraud is a crisis that is being faced by organisations 
internationally. Of all frauds detected in organisations, only 17% were attributed to the internal audit 
function (PwC, 2009). Whilst internal audit was the primary method of detecting fraud, the trend was 
that fewer frauds are being consistently detected. Opportunities to commit fraud are increasing, yet 
insufficient resources are being deployed to improving internal controls. Many organisations are 
considering the use of information technology (IT) to detect fraud (KPMG, 2008). Using IT to 
proactively detect fraud enables organisations to monitor and analyse large transaction datasets in real 
or near real time (Alles, et al., 2006), a task that cannot practically be accomplished by an internal 
auditor. A study of the literature reveals that there is a need for further research into proactive fraud 
detection that uses technology to rapidly analyse large sets of transaction data (Debreceny, et al., 
2005). 
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2. Conceptual Fraud Model 
 
Donald R. Cressy studied the circumstances that led employees to be so overcome by temptation that 
they were driven to violate their position of trust (Coenen, 2008; Wells, 2008). His work provided 
valuable insight into why people commit fraud and it led to the development of the fraud triangle. The 
three key elements of the fraud triangle are; pressure (usually an un-shareable need), rationalisation 
(of personal ethics), and opportunity (and knowledge to commit the fraud).  
 
While all three elements of the fraud triangle must be present in order for a fraud to be perpetrated, 
the concept of opportunity is the main factor that provides a basis for this study. Opportunity and its 
antecedent characteristics are identifiable in an enterprise system. These characteristics can therefore 
be used to proactively detect fraud by analysis of an enterprise systems transaction data and audit 
trails. 
 
Presuming that the elements of pressure and rationalisation pre-exist, a fraudster will actively seek 
opportunities to steal an asset (Wells, 2002; Wells, 2003). The conceptual model for this study 
defines the fundamental nature of fraud; and its detection (Figure 1). Firstly, the model identifies 
factors that motivate an individual to perpetrate fraud. Fraud triangle theory states that three key 
elements need to be present for a fraud to occur i.e. pressure, rationalisation and opportunity. The 
model describes the mental activity that fraudsters experience prior to perpetrating a fraud. They may 
mentally enact several fraud scenarios until a suitable one is found. Once a fraudster determines 
"what to steal" i.e. services, goods or cash, the next decision is "how to steal it" (Figure 2). A 
fraudster has to determine a specific method of perpetrating fraud. The chosen method may entail a 
series of steps taken to achieve the desired outcome of perpetrating a fraud; and concealing it to avoid 
detection.  
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual fraud model 
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Figure 2 describes how fraudsters perceive fraud. An example of an accounts payable (AP) fraud is 
the theft of money that an organisation intends to pay to a vendor namely Employee/What do I 
steal/Money/How do I steal money/divert payments made to vendors. Another example is the 
theft of goods on order by an organisation namely Employee/What do I steal/Goods/How do I steal 
goods/Goods on order from vendors (divert to personal address).  
 
 
Secondly, the model focuses on the detection of fraud in an organisation. This is achieved by 
identifying types of frauds that can occur; creating a catalogue the fraud symptoms; and using 
computer software to detect fraud symptoms.  
 
 
Figure 2: Fraud perception model (FPM) 
 
The conceptual model provides an understanding of the nature of fraud symptoms and its detection in 
enterprise systems. The next sections examine proactive fraud detection and continuous monitoring 
strategies that potentially support a reduction in the incidence of fraud in organisations.  
 
3. Proactive Fraud Detection 
 
Proactive fraud detection requires continuous monitoring of an organisations transaction data. 
Continuous monitoring increases the probability of detecting fraudulent activities (Coderre & Warner, 
1999; Potla, 2003). The traditional or manual audit approach is limited because it reviews only a small 
percentage of a large population of transactions. Large accounting data files with several thousands of 
transactions are difficult to analyse or monitor manually in real-time. The alternative therefore is to 
automate this process by using information  technology (Broady & Roland, 2008).  
 
Every organisation must incorporate consideration of fraud risks within their risk management 
processes. Common fraud schemes, preventive measures and their symptoms or patterns are 
adequately documented in the literature (ACFE, 2010; Albrecht, et al., 2009; Coenen, 2008; Wells, 
2008). Several vendor fraud schemes have been identified in the literature. For example an employee 
may create a fake vendor in the system and submit false invoices for payment. The enterprise system 
may pay these invoices electronically directly into an employee’s bank account (Best, et al., 2009). 
 
Segregating vendor maintenance, invoice entry and payment can significantly reduce the risk of 
accounts payable frauds (Little & Best, 2003; Srinidhi, 1994). Poor, incomplete or a lack of 
segregation of duties can, however, often provide opportunities for fraud schemes (ACFE, 2010; 
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KPMG, 2008, 2009). Early detection of fraud can limit losses and prevent the recurrence of such 
activities. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) has significantly increased corporate organisations 
responsibility for prevention and detection of financial fraud (Best, et al., 2009; ITGI, 2006), 
therefore executives are searching for improved ways to detect fraud (Tackett, 2007) by proactively 
using information technology. The essential steps in detecting fraudulent activities are understanding 
the business or operations; performing a risk analysis to identify the types of frauds that can occur; 
cataloguing the symptoms that the most likely frauds would generate; using computer technology to 
identify fraud symptoms; analysing the results; and investigating suspect transactions (Albrecht, et 
al., 2009). 
 
Automated systems that continuously monitor for key fraud symptoms can be a major deterrent of 
fraud (Best, et al., 2009; Coderre & Warner, 1999; Potla, 2003). By analysing data and searching for 
specific patterns or combination of activities, fraudulent activities can be identified shortly after they 
occur. Data analysis techniques can be used to detect fraudulent activities that have already occurred 
as well as to proactively determine the propensity for frauds occurring in the future (Edge & Falcone 
Sampaio, 2009). Presently only 2.6% of organisations are using data monitoring to proactively detect 
fraud (Figure 3)  (ACFE, 2010). 
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Figure 3: Detection of occupational fraud  
Source: ACFE (2010) 
 
4. Continuous Monitoring Strategies 
 
Examining the transaction process from transaction entry through to posting in the general ledger has 
traditionally been conducted manually, or with Computer Assisted Audit Techniques (CAATs) on a 
retrospective and cyclical basis, usually many months after business activities have transpired 
(Flowerday & von Solms, 2005). This is a massive task as it may involve several thousands of 
transactions hence only a sample of transactions are examined. Even when using CAATs, the 
transactions are examined in batches and generally only on a sample. If transactions are examined in 
their entirety then it is usually done retrospectively.   
 
Continuous monitoring is a way to provide constant monitoring of transaction data in a real or near 
real-time basis against a set of predetermined rule sets (Kuhn Jr & Sutton, 2010). It enables auditors to 
provide a degree of assurance on information shortly after disclosure (Rezaee, et al., 2002). It is a step 
in the path of the evolution of the financial audit from manual to computer-based methods. 
Widespread adoption of computer-based accounting information systems in general, and Enterprise 
Resource Planning (ERP) systems in particular, has contributed to the increasing demand for 
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continuous monitoring (Vasarhelyi, et al., 2004). Two major approaches to continuous monitoring and 
auditing exist. These are Embedded Audit Modules (EAMs), and Monitoring and Control Layer 
(MCL). 
 
Embedded Audit Modules (EAM) 
 
EAMs are software modules that are built into application programs and are specifically designed to 
continuously capture and monitor audit related information (Groomer & Murthy, 1989). If a pre-
programmed constraint is violated an alert is generated, an auditor is informed, and transaction data is 
saved in a file (Best, et al., 2009; Debreceny, et al., 2005; Groomer & Murthy, 1989; Weber, 1999) 
 
Weber (1999) describes EAMs as modules that are placed at specific points within a system to gather 
material information about  events or transactions. EAMs are therefore intended to detect and capture 
data as transactions are processed in the enterprise system. When a violation occurs the offending 
transaction can either be rejected or allowed and an error is logged. ERP systems are designed to 
process transactions efficiently and promptly. It is therefore not practical to disallow every offending 
transaction from being processed. Depending on the severity of the violation, some transactions could 
be conditionally processed whilst others are rejected. The level of severity of errors that would cause a 
transaction to be rejected needs to be negotiated and accepted by the client organisation (Groomer & 
Murthy, 1989).   
 
Research seems to indicate that the EAM approach runs into several difficulties (Debreceny, et al., 
2005; Kuhn & Sutton, 2006). Vasarhelyi and Halper (1991) expressed several challenges to their 
development and implementation, including issues related to design and utilization of system 
resources. Since EAMs are software applications they require computer processing time to execute. 
This imposes an overhead on the system which in turn negatively impacts the monitoring processes. 
Although this overhead can be overcome by adding additional hardware and software resources, these 
additional investments have costs associated with them. There is also the concern about having 
“foreign” software embedded within an organisations enterprise system, and this software being the 
responsibility of a third party (Alles, et al., 2006; Best, et al., 2009; Debreceny, et al., 2005). The 
maintenance of EAMs can also be difficult given the changes, updates and modifications that 
routinely take place in enterprise systems. There are also legal liability issues should the EAM 
damage the host enterprise system in some way, a liability that external auditors may be keen to 
avoid. These factors have impeded the adoption of EAMs in ERP systems (Debreceny et al. 2005; 
Alles et al. 2006). 
 
Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL) 
 
The Monitoring and Control Layer (MCL) introduced by Vasarhelyi et al. (2004) is an alternative 
continuous monitoring and auditing approach to EAMs. MCLs do not replace EAMs, instead they 
offer an alternative solution to cater for different circumstances (Kuhn Jr & Sutton, 2010). In this 
approach the continuous monitoring and auditing system is separate from the client’s enterprise 
system. MCLs are stand-alone systems that rely on comparisons of extracted transaction data with 
pre-determined constraints that allow for continuous monitoring of systems and identification of 
violations (Du & Roohani, 2007). 
 
The MCL primarily operates as a discrepancy-based audit monitoring tool i.e. audit by exception 
(Vasarhelyi, et al., 2004).  The MCL continuously captures enterprise data and analyses it to detect 
any deviations from the norm. Whenever a significant exception is detected, an alarm is generated and 
sent to pre-determined compliance personnel by using relevant delivery technologies such as emails, 
telephone calls or pagers. When an alarm is delivered, compliance personnel will need to review the 
evidence in order to identify the underlying problem. Any further investigations are at the discretion 
of internal auditors.  
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The continuous monitoring system that makes up the MCL (i.e. workstations, operating systems, 
database and application software) resides outside the client’s network and is controlled by the 
auditor. The system receives periodic data updates from the client’s enterprise system, (i.e. not in real-
time), that is processed inside the application. The system monitors key operational analytics, 
compares them with pre-defined standards and creates exception reports for any potential problems. 
Any violations that trigger automatic alerts to the auditor are stored inside the application and not 
inside the client’s enterprise system. 
 
MCLs are external systems that operate independently of the information system to be monitored but 
are linked into the system. They rely on comparisons of extracted transaction data with pre-
determined constraints to identify violations. This separate design has profound implications for the 
design of a general model for continuous monitoring and auditing as it eliminates any conflict 
between the MCL and the enterprise system. The MCL approach is therefore a major facilitator for 
implementing continuous monitoring and auditing in enterprise systems.  
 
Continuous monitoring systems capture and analyse enterprise system audit trail data to detect any 
deviations from the norm. Audit trails are a chronological record of activities performed in an 
enterprise system and are therefore an essential component in monitoring activities performed in an 
enterprise system. The usefulness of audit trails in detecting potentially fraudulent activities is 
examined next. 
 
5. Audit Trails 
 
Audit trails are records of users’ activities within an information system (Best, 2005; NIST, 2005). 
Audit trails are maintained by the operating system and applications such as database systems and 
enterprise systems (Best, et al., 2004). The information captured in an audit trail is dependent on what 
events are being audited by the system (SAP-AG, 2009). In conjunction with appropriate tools and 
procedures, audit trails can assist in detecting potentially fraudulent activities. 
 
Audit trails attempt to establish a chronological list of steps that are necessary to start a transaction 
through to its completion. Audit trails can range from being very simplistic to extremely complicated. 
The complexity depends on the number of steps involved in the transaction. For example, an audit 
trail on a payment of a vendor invoice begins with the receipt of the invoice. The invoice is tracked 
through accounts payable, all the way through to payment in order to settle the debt (Tatum, 2010) 
 
Denning (1987) introduced the concept of using audit trails to detect anomalous user behaviour. 
Denning's model is rule-based and exploits audit trails to search for and report abnormal user 
behaviour. The basic objective of the model is to monitor audit records looking for deviations in 
usage. Audit trails may be reviewed: i) periodically, ii) as needed (triggered by a security event), iii) 
automatically in real-time, or iv) some combination of these. Audit trails can be used to 
retrospectively determined review what events occurred. Reviewers need to know what to look for i.e. 
what is normal activity and what is suspicious activity. Audit trail review is made easier if the audit 
trail can be analysed by user ID, terminal ID, application name, date and time, or some other set of 
parameters to run reports of selected information (NIST, 2005).  
 
Audit trails provide an auditor a means to review user activities by allowing examination of the 
history of access by individual users or groups of users, showing actions performed or attempted. 
Analysis of audit trails may reveal activities that violate segregation of duties, match known fraud 
symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous (Best, 2005; Best, et al., 2009; NIST, 2005). Audit trails 
can therefore be an effective tool in managing financial resources of an organization. Prior to 
analysing audit trail data, a framework needs to be developed to enable detection of potentially 
fraudulent activities.  
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6. Framework for Detecting Fraud 
 
Perpetration of an accounts payable (AP) fraud requires the creation of a shell company and the 
submission of fictitious invoices to an organisation for payment (Best, et al., 2009; O'Gara, 2004; 
Wells, 2002a). To successfully perpetrate this type of fraud the fraudster needs to access to the 
following enterprise system elements; i) creation or modification of vendor master records; and ii) 
invoice entry sub-system (Best, et al., 2009; Narayan, 2008; Padhi, 2010). 
 
Vendor master records can be created or modified in the following ways; i) create a fake vendor ; ii) 
temporarily modify an existing vendor (flipping); iii) permanently modify an existing vendor; or iv) 
use a one-time account (Best, 2008; O'Gara, 2004; Singleton, et al., 2008). 
 
Invoices can be entered in an enterprise system in the following ways; i) create a fake invoice; ii) use 
a legitimate invoice; or iii) create or use a duplicate invoice (Best, 2005; Singleton, et al., 2008). 
 
Key components of the framework for proactive fraud detection include defining data requirements 
for fraud detection; and creating a catalogue of fraud symptoms. The catalogue of fraud symptoms 
comprises critical combinations of user activities and known fraud symptoms.  
 
Critical Combinations 
 
Many frauds occur because fraudsters exploit the lack of internal controls or they may override 
existing internal controls that are poorly implemented. For example, an employee that creates or 
modifies a vendor master record should not be able to enter an invoice. Having this capability does 
not indicate that a fraud has taken place, but it does create an opportunity for a fraud to be perpetrated. 
By detecting these critical combinations of user activities; i) an auditor can further investigate 
transactions that match known fraud symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous and, ii) an 
organisation can take steps to correct the situation thereby reducing the probability of future fraud.  
 
The concept of separating critical business activities in order to reduce fraud is termed segregation of 
duties. In its simplest form, the Segregation of Duties (SoDs) principle states that sensitive tasks 
should be divided into two or more steps with each step being performed by a different user (Li, et 
al., 2007). This study supports the following principles of SoDs within the accounts payable function 
as proposed by Little and Best (2003); i) users who can create and modify master records should not 
be able to post transactions; and ii) payments should be performed by someone other than the person 
who enters vendor invoices (Figure 4). 
 
Known Fraud Symptoms 
 
Accounts payable fraud schemes occur when a fraudster causes an organization to issue a payment by 
submitting invoices for fictitious goods or services, inflated invoices, or invoices for personal 
purchases. Activities that violate segregation of duties are indicators of potential fraud and require 
further investigation. These activities are investigated to determine whether they match known fraud 
symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous. Methods to detect several known accounts payable fraud 
symptoms are specified in Table 1. 
 
Enterprise systems software are available from several vendors, however SAP has consistently been 
the market leader for several years, accounting for 22.4% of market share (Lager & Tsai, 2008; SAP, 
2010). Several Fortune 500 companies use SAP exclusively for their core day to day operations 
including accounting and financial applications, procurement, order processing and supplier 
management, inventory management and HR management and payroll functions (BOS, 2009; 
Gartner, 2010). Consequently, the focus of this paper is on fraud detection in the SAP enterprise 
system. In the next section we examine the level of support provided for fraud detection in SAP. 
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Figure 4: Critical combinations of AP activities 
Source: adapted from Little and Best (2003) 
 
7. SAP Support for Fraud Detection 
 
SAP audit trails provide detailed descriptions of functions performed within an enterprise system. 
Each function in SAP has a transaction code associated with it. A transaction code (or t-code) consists 
of letters, numbers, or both (for example, FB60 – Enter Vendor Invoice). A transaction code is a 
shortcut that takes the user directly to a SAP application rather than having to navigate through the 
menu system (Padhi, 2010). Each transaction code executed by a user is recorded in the audit trail 
(Best, 2000). The audit trail data required for this study is stored in several tables within the SAP 
enterprise system (Figure 5). 
 
Changes to master records are stored in two tables, CDHDR Change Document Headers, and CDPOS 
Change Document Items (Best, 2005; Best, et al., 2009; Hirao, 2009; Padhi, 2010). Changes to master 
records include creation and deletion of master records and changes to fields. For every change 
document number, there is a corresponding change document item in the CDPOS table. Accounting 
audit trails are stored in tables BKPF – Accounting Document Header, BSEG – Accounting 
Document Line Item, SKAT – General Ledger Account Texts, and LFA1- Vendor General Data. 
Tables BKPF and BSEG store the posting history for both general ledger accounts and subsidiary 
ledger records, thereby facilitating both integration of data and automatic reconciliation of subsidiary 
ledgers with reconciliation accounts. General ledger account texts (names) are stored in table SKAT.  
 
Vendor general data including vendor name, date created and creating user are stored in table LFA1. 
The relationships between the various SAP tables are shown in Figure 6. These relationships are 
exploited by the proactive fraud detection methodology developed in this study. 
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Table 1: Methods to detect known AP fraud symptoms 
Symptom General Detection Strategy 
Change in vendor payment details followed by a 
change back to the original after a short time 
(flipping) and payments are made in the interim 
period 
§ Detect changes to vendor master data that 
result in a vendor having different bank 
details over a period of time. Payments of 
invoices are made in the interim period. 
Previous bank details are subsequently 
reinstated after being updated with new 
details.  
Duplicate transactions § Check if the same payment details are 
used by more than one vendor 
Invoices with round dollar amounts § Extract all invoices with round dollar 
amounts (e.g. $1000.00) 
Invoices with amounts consistently below 
approval limit 
§ Extract all vendors with multiple invoices 
below approval limit (e.g. several $999 
payments to vendor when limit is $1000) 
Vendors with payments that exceed their 12-
month average by a significant amount  
§ Extract all vendors where payments 
exceed 12-month average by a percentage 
e.g. 200% 
Vendors with payments exceeds the last largest 
payment by a significant amount  
§ Extract all vendors where payment is 
larger than the last largest payment by a 
percentage e.g. 200% 
Vendors with similar names § Extract all vendors whose names are 
similar to other companies 
Vendors that become active after long periods of 
being dormant 
§ Extract all vendors that become active 
after long periods of inactivity 
Same vendor  having different payment details § Extract all vendors with multiple master 
records, each having different payment 
details 
§ Check for multiple payments using 
different bank account details 
Multiple vendors sharing the same payment 
details 
§ Extract all vendors that share the same 
payment details 
Source: adapted from (Best, et al., 2009; Lanza, 2003; Wells, 2008) 
 
 
Figure 5: SAP audit trails 
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Figure 6: Relationship between SAP tables 
 
8. Fraud Detection in SAP 
 
The SoDs principles previously discussed can be detected in SAP by examining t-codes of functions 
performed by users. A list of t-codes pertinent to each of the two SoDs principles is listed in Table 2. 
 
In order to detect a violation of the first SoDs principle it is necessary to identify users that perform 
vendor maintenance (FK01, FK02, XK01, XK02) and enter invoices (FB60, F-43, FB01, FB10) or 
post payments (F-53, F-58, F110). In order to detect a violation of the second SoDs principle it is 
necessary to identify users that enter invoices (FB60, F-43, FB01, FB10) and post payments (F-53, F-
58, F110). User activities that violate these two SoDs principles may be further investigated to 
determine whether they match known fraud symptoms, or appear otherwise anomalous by extracting 
data from the previously mentioned SAP tables. Table 2 informs this process.   
 
Table 2: SAP transaction codes 
T-Code SAP Description 
Vendor Maintenance 
FK01 Create Vendor (Accounting) 
FK02 Change Vendor (Accounting) 
  
XK01 Create Vendor (Centrally) 
XK02 Change Vendor (Centrally) 
Enter Invoice 
FB60 Enter Vendor Invoice 
F-43 Enter Vendor Invoice: Header Data 
FB01 Post Document (allows posting of any financial transaction) 
FB10 Invoice/Credit Memo Fast Entry 
Post Payment 
F-53 Post Outgoing Payment 
F-58 Post Payment with Printout 
F110 Automatic Payments 
 
Data describing user activities is well-documented in the audit trails of SAP enterprise systems. 
Analysing user activities for potential fraud, however, is a difficult task if done manually. Automated 
systems that continuously monitor for key fraud symptoms can be a major deterrent of fraud (Best, et 
al., 2009; Coderre & Warner, 1999; Potla, 2003). By analysing transaction data and searching for 
specific patterns or combination of activities, fraudulent activities can be identified shortly after they 
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occur. Computer based data analysis techniques can be used to detect fraudulent activities that have 
already occurred, as well as proactively determining the propensity for frauds occurring in the future 
(Edge & Falcone Sampaio, 2009). An automated methodology for proactive fraud detection is 
proposed in the next section. 
 
9. Proactive Fraud Detection Methodology 
 
Modern integrated enterprise systems may record several thousands of transactions daily. A 
significant issue often raised in the literature regarding continuous fraud detection systems relates to 
information overload from alerts (Alles, et al., 2006; Alles, et al., 2008; Kuhn & Sutton, 2006). 
Therefore, simple detection of fraudulent activities is insufficient. It is imperative to develop 
innovative approaches for analysis and presentation of information to an auditor. The methodology 
developed for this study addresses these issues.   
 
This study proposes a two phase MCL-based strategy for proactive fraud detection in an 
organisation’s SAP enterprise system. In phase one, transaction data is periodically extracted from 
SAP. The requisite data is extracted from SAP tables CDHDR (change document headers), CDPOS 
(change document items), BKPF (accounting document headers), BSEG (accounting document 
items), SKAT (general ledger account texts), and LFA1 (vendor general data).  
 
In phase two, extracted transaction data is analysed by a software application. The analysis consists of 
two stages. In stage one, critical combinations of user activities are identified. These activities violate 
SoDs and require further investigation. In stage two, user activities that violate SoDs are further 
investigated to determine whether they match known fraud symptoms, or appear otherwise 
anomalous. The volume of alerts produced by large transaction data sets may be difficult to interpret. 
Consequently, user profiling and 'drill-down' capabilities enhance useability by enabling an auditor to 
peruse detailed user or vendor centric activities.  
 
Stage one involves routine analysis of transaction data. A summarised list of activities performed in 
the system provides the context of analysis for an auditor (Table 3 and Figure 7). Data visualization 
techniques are used to graphically represent this information in the form of charts, graphs, and link-
node (network) maps. Representing large amounts of data visually enables an auditor to effectively 
find trends, correlations, and identify patterns of activity that may lead to important conclusions 
regarding potentially fraudulent activities. 
 
Table 3: Activity summary 
T-Code Transaction Name Activity 
FB60 Enter Incoming Invoices 2305 
F-53 Post Outgoing Payments 2135 
FK02 Change Vendor (Accounting) 252 
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Figure 7: Activity summary 
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The next step in the analysis process is an investigation of user profiles. User profiles document 
combinations of transaction codes performed by individual users in the system (Table 4). A network 
(link-node) map visualises the relationships between users and the transaction codes they have 
performed. This may assist an auditor in visualising user activities and identification of users' 
violating SoDs (Figure 8). 
 
Table 4: User profile 
User Transaction 
Watts FB60 F-53  
Green    FK02 
John FB60   
Smith FB60 F-53 FK02 
Jones     FK02 
 
 
Figure 8: User profile 
 
In stage two, user activities that violate SoDs may be further investigated by an auditor. An example 
of such an investigation entails detailed examination of activities performed by user SMITH, as this 
user has violated SoDs by performing vendor maintenance, invoice and payment activities (a critical 
combination). Drill-down facilities produce user specific reports and visualisations detailing activities 
performed by user SMITH (Figure 9). This process of combining visualisation with tabulated reports 
enhances an auditor’s ability to promptly identify potentially fraudulent activities without being 
overwhelmed with excessive information. 
 
10. Limitations 
 
Audit trails maintained in an SAP Enterprise System form the basis of the methodology developed in 
this paper. Consequently, the integrity of these audit trails is of vital importance in assessing the 
usefulness and accuracy of the fraud detection process. Furthermore, the detection process itself may 
generate incorrect results due to type I (false positive) or type II (false negative) errors. A false 
positive results in fraudulent transactions being classified as legitimate. A false negative results in 
legitimate transactions being classified as fraudulent.  
 
System and security administrators that have the capability to create and/or maintain users may create 
fake users and act in their name. Users identified through proactive fraud detection must be 
investigated to determine whether they are real. Vendor frauds may also be perpetrated using 
duplicate vendor master records. In this situation flipping of a vendor's banking details is not required.  
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There is also the threat of collusion between users, such that no one user performs all required tasks to 
perpetrate a fraud. A combination of these methods may be used.  
 
The proposed fraud detection methodology may not be useful in detecting fraud by system and 
security administrators, nor fraud perpetrated by two or more user in collusion. However, this 
methodology is intended to assist an auditor in early detection of fraudulent activities perpetrated by 
normal system users.  
 
 
Figure 9: User-vendor activities 
 
 
11. Conclusion and Future Research 
 
This paper examines the feasibility of proactive fraud detection in enterprise systems, in general, and 
SAP in particular. The paper examines the level of support provided by SAP for fraud detection, and 
proposes a MCL-based methodology for proactive fraud detection. This paper presents significant 
advances over current Computer Assisted Audit Techniques (CAATs) by emphasizing the importance 
of visual presentation of information to an auditor. This is unlike current practice that involves 
analysis of lengthy reports or spreadsheets.       
 
Although we have provided two visualisations that show; i) user profiles; and ii) user-vendor 
activities, future work will focus on drill-down capabilities that provide analysis of transactions 
performed by targeted users. Reporting will include fraud symptoms documented in Table 1. 
Visualisations will include graphs, charts and link-node diagrams. Future work will also focus on 
presenting a high-level view of activities performed in accounts payable (AP). The objective is to 
integrate multiple sources of information into a unified view that may assist an auditor to effectively 
and efficiently identify patterns of activity that may lead to important conclusions regarding 
potentially fraudulent activities.    
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